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ABSTRACT 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs’) require that a certain fraction of the electricity generated for a given region be produced from renewable resources. California’s RPS mandates that by 2020, 33% of the electricity sold in the state must be generated from renewables. Such mandates have important implications for the electricity sector as well as for the whole society. In this paper, we estimate the costs and benefits of varying 2020 California RPS targets on electricity prices, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, criteria pollutant emissions, the electricity generation mix, the labor market, renewable investment decisions, and social welfare. We have extended the RPS Calculator model, developed by Energy and Environmental Economics (E3) Inc., to account for distributions of fuel and generation costs, to incorporate demand functions, and to estimate the effects of RPS targets on GHG emissions, criteria pollutant emissions, and employment. The results of our modeling provide the following policy insights: (1) the average 2020 electricity price increases as the RPS target rises, with values ranging between $0.152 and $0.175/kWh (2008 dollars) for the 20% RPS to 50% RPS, respectively; (2) the 33% and 50% RPS targets decrease the GHG emissions by about 17.6 and 35.8 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO2e) relative to the 20% RPS; (3) the GHG emission reduction costs of the RPS options are high ($71 to $94 per ton) relative to results from policy options other than RPS or prices that are common in the carbon markets; and (4) a lower target (e.g., a 27% RPS) provides higher social welfare than the 33% RPS (mandate) under low and moderate CO2 social costs (lower than $35/ton); while a higher RPS target (e.g., 50%) is more beneficial when using high CO2 social costs or with rapid renewable technology diffusion. However, under all studied scenarios, the mandated 33% RPS for California would not provide the best cost/benefit values among the possible targets and would not maximize the net social benefit objective.  
KEYWORDS- renewable portfolio standard, benefit/cost analysis, social welfare, GHG emissions, electricity generation, sustainable energy.  
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1. Introduction 
Renewable electricity resources are critically important in the efforts to address climate change [1] and 
to provide a clean source of domestic energy [2] that could also increase employment opportunities [3]. 
The renewable portfolio standard (RPS) has been adopted worldwide to encourage the use of 
renewables. Twenty nine out of 50 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia have adopted mandatory 
RPS standards [4]. For the state of California, Senate Bill SB2 (X1) mandates that 33% of the electricity 
sales by all electricity retailers be generated from renewable resources (without constraining the types of 
renewables to be used) by 2020 [5], following an earlier RPS target of 20% for 2010. California’s RPS 
target is one of the most aggressive in the U.S. The implications of RPS targets are far-reaching 
however, and policy makers should carefully examine the range of potential effects when designing such 
aggressive RPS targets.   
 
RPS policies can significantly influence various indicators of the electricity sector [7-10]. As one 
important indicator, higher costs for electricity production have shown to be a usual byproduct of RPS 
programs (e.g., see Crane et al. [9], Barbose et al. [10], and Kydes [11]). Two California specific 
analyses have predicted that the mandated target of 33% is an ambitious RPS target requiring major new 
transmission lines [8], and that the costs of statewide electricity generation would increase between 
about 2% [12] and 7% [8] relative to a 20% RPS. RPS policies can also affect investment in renewables 
as well as adoption of renewable technology. With respect to investment, some evidence indicates that 
lack of a requirement for new capacity, coupled with an ability to deploy out-of-state renewable 
generation, could even reduce investment in renewable generation under RPS programs [13-14].  
Despite the relatively successful implementation of numerous RPS programs worldwide, it is 
unclear (especially by looking at their estimated impacts on the electricity sectors) whether the basic 
reasoning behind RPS adoption is driven by factors such as the environment and promotion of domestic 
energy sources or rather (in few cases) by political/administrative considerations and powerful private 
lobbies [15-16]. Finally, the choice of the RPS target levels has been questioned in certain states, such as 
California [17].  
To address these concerns, one key aspect of RPS targets that has not been well studied is how 
varying target levels can impact society as a whole. In one of the very few studies analyzing the welfare 
effects for the U.S., Palmer and Burtraw [18] compared different RPS targets along with a cap-and-trade 
and a renewable energy production tax credit policy and found that to achieve a comparable reduction in 
GHGs, the cap-and-trade is the most cost effective option with $82 per ton of CO2, while the 15% RPS 
costs $148 per ton (well beyond the present market values) and the 20% RPS costs $532/ton. However, 
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the estimated cost of CO2 abatement from RPS programs is much higher than the cost range ($11 to $34 
per ton of CO2) found by Johnson [19]. The Palmer and Burtraw study [18] can also be contrasted with 
that of Nogee et al. [20] where the results suggest that not only do RPS targets reduce electricity prices, 
but a 20% RPS offers higher benefits for society than a 10% RPS.  
Nearly all of the RPS studies to date [18 & 21-22] lack detailed cost benefit analyses on how, 
and under what conditions, an RPS target should be implemented. For example, although Palmer and 
Burtraw [18] were very detailed in their cost analyses, the study falls short in considering the overall 
effects of an RPS policy on employment, generation mix, change in demand, etc. In addition, most of 
the previous social welfare studies, including Palmer and Burtraw [18] and Bird et al. [22], assume the 
same RPS target for all states in the US, which is simply impossible to implement. A similar concern 
was echoed by Mosey and Vimmerstedt [23]. The study called for advancement in state-of-the-art 
methodologies for assessing RPS policies. Our review of these past efforts demonstrate that critical 
elements of the welfare changes resulting from an RPS have not been exhaustively catalogued or 
examined in detail.  
In this research, we develop a new and comprehensive framework that integrates cost benefit 
analysis into an examination of RPS targets by region. Our study contributes to the state of knowledge in 
two ways. First, as shown earlier, the inclusion of social welfare into an examination of RPS targets is a 
critically important, but as yet remains rather unexplored dimension of analysis. Second, this study 
develops a regional research framework that examines the welfare aspects to RPS target setting at a local 
level. A regional analysis could closely align with local utility provision boundaries and the availability 
of local renewable resources.  
In this study, we analyze the effects of implementing various RPS targets in California on 
regional electricity prices, consumers, generation mix, GHG emissions, criteria pollutant emissions, 
renewable resource portfolios, employment in the electricity sector, and the effects on electricity 
demand and supply under different fuel price settings and environmental conditions. We employ the 
RPS Calculator model, developed by Energy and Environmental Economics (E3) Inc., and extend its 
analytical engine by improving its forecast accuracy and expanding its impact analysis.  
Our methodology is more comprehensive than those employed in most previous RPS studies, 
especially in terms of (1) the use of stochastic inputs, (2) the detailed calculations of criteria pollutant 
and GHG emissions and employment, and (3) the embedded modeling feature of responsive demand to 
prices. While results from our study on California’s RPS cannot be extensively generalized to other 
states because of difference in factors such as RPS requirements and potentials/limits across states, our 
new welfare assessment framework can be applied in almost any context to analyze RPS targets in other 
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states as well as to evaluate California’s future RPS targets (e.g., the 2030 target which is the topic of 
current debates in the state). 
 
2. Modeling 
When designing RPS targets to regulate the electricity sector, three key questions must be considered: 
(1) How will the state meet the target (i.e., how much change will be needed in the generation portfolio), 
(2) what will be the costs of reaching the target, and (3) what are the broader welfare effects of 
implementing the targets? To provide detailed answers to these questions, we need a comprehensive 
modeling framework. To that end, we employed the RPS Calculator as our benchmark model. The RPS 
Calculator estimates the renewable resources that must be procured to meet California’s RPS goals, 
using very detailed information on the commercial renewable projects and the transmission and 
generation costs of producing electricity from renewables [24]. 
The RPS Calculator was developed by Energy and Environmental Economics (E3) Inc. for the 
purpose of evaluating different RPS targets for California [24]. Using fixed demand estimations, the 
model constructs the supply function (See Appendix A for more details) with the use of detailed 
information on the commercial projects, i.e., projects that are expected to come online in the near (or 
mid) term, and the transmission and generation costs of producing electricity from renewables. The 
calculations start with an estimation of the renewable resources statewide that the utilities in California 
must procure between 2012 and 2020 to meet a specified RPS target by 2020. Then, the RPS Calculator 
ranks and selects the renewable resources needed to meet the RPS target(s) based on their cost 
effectiveness until the new renewables equal the required RPS target renewable sales.  
 We have extended the RPS Calculator model in several ways. First, electricity demand in the 
original RPS Calculator is fixed, using the California Energy Commission (CEC) study demand 
forecasts [25]. However, the CEC study have estimated demand by using electricity generation costs that 
are based on the 20% RPS (the initial target); as a result, the demand estimates are inconsistent with the 
demand expected from implementing other RPS targets because the corresponding electricity costs 
(prices) would be different for each target. To address this issue, we incorporate short-run and long-run 
demand functions that are responsive to prices and estimates the electricity demand endogenously. 
Based on the average estimates found from various studies [26-28], we assume a short-run elasticity of -
0.1 and a long-run elasticity of -0.50. With this modification to the RPS Calculator, electricity demand 
responds to changes in the electricity sector that affect electricity prices (See Appendix A for additional 
details about how demand will be determined/updated). Second, instead of using point estimates of input 
parameters (while it is much more likely that the estimated value will take on a range of values), our 
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modified model allows the use of random parameters based on various types of distributions. In fact, 
considering uncertainty associated with future fuel prices, we allow fuel prices to be random variables 
with normal distributions. By randomizing these key parameters/input, our modified RPS model is able 
to capture the effects of different fuel price combinations (See Figure B1, Appendix B).  
 In addition, we have added three new modules to the RPS Calculator, calculating (1) the changes 
in GHG emissions, (2) changes in criteria pollutant emissions, and (3) changes in employment, under 
different RPS targets. We estimate GHG emissions based on two sets of emission rates (See Table C1- 
row a, Appendix C): (1) the non-life-cycle analysis (non-LCA) values inherited from the RPS 
Calculator; and (2) the LCA values. The health-related benefits of reductions in criteria pollutant 
emissions (which accounts for mortality damages of SO2, NOx, and primary PM2.5 emissions) are 
calculated based on the assumptions discussed in Appendix C (Table C1- row b). Changes in 
employment (from the 20% RPS target) are estimated based on changes in the generation mix, applying 
job creation rates (the average number of job-years per GWh for each type of generation) on the 
electricity generation mix (Table C1- row c, Appendix C). Finally, Appendix E explains our 
assumptions related to generation cost minimization and California’s carbon market and lists key 
limitations of our model.  
 As discussed above, our methodology is far more comprehensive than those employed in most 
previous RPS studies, especially since it provides detailed information required to conduct a 
comprehensive social benefit/cost analysis. Appendices A through D provide details for all of the inputs 
considered in our modeling, the modifications made to the RPS Calculator, the procedures used to 
estimate various outputs, and the limitations of our methods.  
 
3. RPS Impact Analysis 
3.1. Generation Mix 
One of the major goals for implementing RPS targets is to promote the kinds of technology 
transformations needed to lower the long-run costs of producing electricity and to encourage resource 
diversity [8]. In fact, most beneficial outcomes of an RPS target are derived from changes in generation 
mix, especially from changes in renewable generation. In addition, the generation mix and technology 
costs subsequently affect electricity pricing and demand.  
  Note that in our model, we assume that: (1) changes in conventional generation are based mainly 
on levels of natural gas generation; (2) the limits on the percentage of electricity supplied by out-of-state 
generation (as a separate category) are applied to each of the three compliance periods, in accordance 
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with the SB2 (1X) [5]; and (3) the relative magnitude of conventional generation and renewable 
generation is mostly determined by the RPS target. Based on these assumptions, our model estimates 
that total 2020 in-state and out-of-state renewable generation would increase from 45,000 and 17,000 
GWhs (for the 20% RPS target) to 117,000 and 23,000 GWhs (for the 50% RPS target). The estimated 
ratio of in-state to out-of-state renewable generation varies by the RPS target, ranging from 2.5 to 1 
(RPS 20%) to 5 to 1 (RPS 50%) by 2020. With these in mind, Figure 1 shows the 2020 in-state (2-a) and 
out-of-state (2-b) generation mix of renewable resources for each RPS target. Figure 1 also shows the 
2013 in-state and out-of-state renewable portfolio (the current renewable mix) for comparison. Note that 
the 2013 portfolio is similar to the 2020 portfolios for the 20% and 27% RPS targets (since in 2013, 
around 20% of in-state generation was from renewables). However, because of the differences in 
demand and costs in different years, the 2013 and 2020 portfolios should be compared with caution.        
  For 2020 out-of-state generation, wind would be the main renewable resource (67% to 75%) 
under almost all RPS targets. For in-state generation, geothermal (37%) and wind (27%) are the primary 
resources for the 20% RPS target, while solar (34%) and wind (30%) are the dominant resources for the 
50% RPS target. The major portfolio change from the 20% RPS to the 50% RPS occurs with a sharp 
increase in solar PV generation followed by increases in wind and solar thermal generation. As reflected 
in Figure 1, California will be able to use a wide variety of resources, including biogas, biomass, 
geothermal, small hydro, solar PV, solar thermal, and wind to meet its RPS targets.  
 
Fig. 1. 2013 renewable mix and 2020 renewable portfolios of various RPS targets for (a) in-state; and (b) out-of-state generation. 
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3.2. Electricity Cost and Demand 
Each RPS target induces a change in the electricity generation mix, which affects the electricity 
generation costs (e.g., higher costs are typically associated with using generally more expensive 
renewables that would not be cost effective to use without an RPS). The change in generation mix also 
distorts electricity prices, which, in turn, influences electricity demand. Figure 2 shows the resulting 
average costs of electricity generation to meet various RPS targets in 2015 and 2020. Electricity prices 
are reported in terms of 2008 cents/kWh. We calculate these prices by dividing the total electricity 
generation costs by total retail sales with no consideration for the price variation across different electric 
utilities. To account for and simulate the effects of different combinations of fuel costs (Figure B1, 
Appendix B), the model was run one hundred times for each RPS target. Since the fuel prices are 
random variables, the outputs are also random variables with expected values (averages), and maximum 
and minimum values.  
As expected, Figure 2 shows that the average 2020 electricity prices would increase as the RPS 
target rises, with the average 2020 price for the 50% RPS as the highest. Average electricity prices range 
from $0.152/kWh for the 20% RPS to $0.175/kWh for the 50% RPS. These results show that a 50% 
RPS would increase price by 15% compared to the average price associated with a 20% RPS.  
Relative to the CPUC [8] 2020 reference price estimate of $0.169/kWh for the 33% RPS, our 
average estimate of $0.162/kWh is lower by about 4%, mainly because we allow demand to decrease as 
a result of higher electricity prices derived from meeting higher RPS targets. Over time, however, 
lowered demand for electricity induces lower prices. For high RPS targets, we argue that demand 
response can mitigate electricity prices to some extent. As a result, the electricity market would not face 
substantially higher prices when implementing high RPS targets. However, this result cannot be 
generalized to other states since California has the potential to promote different types of renewables at 
lower costs, compared to many other states in the U.S. Another major reason for our lower price 
estimate is that the more up-to-date natural gas price forecasts are substantially lower than those 
assumed in the CPUC study, as a result of rapid shale gas developments in recent years. As discussed in 
Appendix E (See Table E1), the impact of the change in natural gas prices on the analysis is substantial. 
In fact, the sudden decline in natural gas prices has made renewables and RPS policies less favorable to 
the society (or reduced social welfare benefits of RPS programs) since it widens the gap between the 
cost of renewable electricity generation and the (substantially-reduced) cost of conventional natural gas 
generation. Therefore, the initial estimates (with much higher natural gas prices) about the RPS impacts 
that led to the choice of the mandated 33% RPS are not valid. 
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As shown in Figure 2, our model predicts that the increase in electricity prices would not be 
linear with respect to RPS targets. This is because the commercial renewable projects come online in 
different years and technology diffusion influences the prices in a complex manner.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. 2015 and 2020 annual electricity prices from implementing various RPS targets. 
 
Figure 2 indicates that a 2020 RPS target of 27% would increase the 2020 average price, relative 
to the respective 20% RPS price, by about 3%. In contrast, the mandated 33% RPS would increase the 
price by 6%. Figure 2 also shows the estimated range and the standard errors of the 2015 and 2020 
prices in addition to the average prices. For the maximum electricity prices (resulting from high 
conventional fuel price conditions), renewables become less costly than conventional generation. This 
makes renewables an attractive option irrespective of the RPS target level. The electricity prices 
resulting from the RPS target levels differ significantly only for the cases in which conventional fuel 
prices are medium or low. Specifically, these targets could be met with no price increase when natural 
gas prices are high. However, high natural gas prices are very unlikely with the increasing production of 
shale gas [29].     
Figure 3 shows the average annual demand in thousand GWhs for different RPS targets, along 
with the minimum and maximum demand obtained from different simulation runs. The short-run 
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corresponding prices. Relative to the 20% RPS demand in 2020, an average decrease in demand ranging 
from 1% (27% RPS) to 6% (50% RPS) is projected by 2020. These reductions in demand will lead to 
social welfare losses (discussed later); that is, consumers are expected to be worse off when they should 
be consuming less electricity.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. 2015 and 2020 annual electricity demand for various RPS targets. 
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RPS. The 17.6 MMTCO2e decrease is comparable to the California Air Resources Board’s estimation 
[30] that a 33% RPS could reduce GHG emissions by 14.2 MMTCO2e. Our estimate is slightly higher, 
mainly because we have included a demand response mechanism.  
For lower RPS targets, the majority of the reductions will be achieved by 2015-2016; then, as the 
fuel generation mix and demand change in later years, GHG reductions will remain nearly constant. For 
higher RPS targets, however, GHGs will decrease steeply in 2018 and 2019 as we approach the 2020 
deadline. The 33% and 27% RPS can be achieved with a smooth transition in generation early on, while 
the higher RPS targets will result in generation changes and GHG reductions closer to 2020. This result 
has important implications for policy design since the present GHG reductions could be much more 
valuable than the future GHG reductions to control climate change. In fact, a low RPS target is not 
substantially different from a high RPS target in providing the actions needed to immediately reduce 
CO2 emissions.           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Average LCA GHG emissions reduction from implementing various RPS targets, relative to the 20% RPS. 
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substantial unit reduction cost, with a slight increase in the cost for higher RPS targets (i.e., from an 
average cost of $71 per ton GHG reduction under the 27% RPS to $94 per ton GHG emission reduction 
for the 50% RPS). Interestingly, these estimated GHG emission reduction costs are relatively higher 
when compared to those reported in the literature [31-32], or compared to the prices prevalent in the 
carbon markets [33] and the newly established California market carbon prices [34]. 
 This higher cost verifies the results found in other studies that other policy options could be 
more cost effective than RPS; for example, the carbon markets induce lower CO2 prices/costs than the 
RPS targets [18, 22]. Note that our estimates are generally lower than the costs of abatement from RPSs 
found in the Palmer and Burtraw study [18] and are moderately higher than the Johnson study [19]’s 
estimates. However, these comparisons should be done with care since these estimates are found for 
different case studies and for different RPS targets.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. 2020 average GHG emission reduction costs ($/MMTCO2e) and the corresponding 2020 average GHG 
reductions (MMTCO2e) for each RPS target. 
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change in employee surplus [35]. The corresponding welfare values in our analysis are from (1) higher 
costs of generation for producers, (2) electricity demand reductions, (3) emissions mitigations, (4) higher 
subsidies and lower taxes for government, and (5) employment gains. We ignore government loss since 
the subsidies for renewables will be gradually removed over time, and since electricity generation costs 
include the subsidies to some extent.     
To estimate the social benefit/cost effects of different RPS targets, we need to make a few 
assumptions about relevant parameters/coefficients, including the emissions rate generated from each 
renewable technology, the social cost of GHG emissions, the marginal health-related benefit of reducing 
criteria pollutant emissions, the social value of each unit of employment, and the cost trend of renewable 
generation.  
By creating various scenarios with combinations of different parameter values, we can develop a 
number of useful policy insights. Table 1 describes the main features assumed for the base case 
(Scenario 1) along with seven alternative scenarios. Scenario 1 is based on the life cycle analysis (LCA) 
GHG emission rates, CO2 social cost of $30 per ton, the social value of $50,000 per job-year created, the 
base carbon market price forecasts [36], and the projected costs for renewable electricity generation. 
According to estimates from Bureau of Labor Statistics [37], the annual employment value of $50,000 
per job is based on the 2013 average wage of solar and wind installers and technicians in California. All 
other scenarios are designed by examining the effects of changes in features of Scenario 1, as Scenario 1 
represents our anticipated values of social costs of carbon, carbon market prices, renewable technology 
diffusion trends, etc.  
 
Table 1 Main features of base scenario and alternative scenarios. 
  Definition Emission rates CO2 cost ($/ton) Value of labor               ($/year) Renewable cost trend Carbon market  
Scenario 1 Base LCA 30 50,000 Base base estimate 
Scenario 2 Non-LCA Non-LCA 30 50,000 Base base estimate 
Scenario 3 High CO2 price LCA 60 50,000 Base base estimate 
Scenario 4 Very high CO2 price LCA 90 50,000 Base base estimate 
Scenario 5 Low labor value LCA 30 25,000 Base base estimate 
Scenario 6 No labor benefit LCA 30 0 Base base estimate 
Scenario 7 Technology advancement LCA 30 50,000 Major drop base estimate 
Scenario 8 Low carbon market prices LCA 30 50,000 Base CARB Floor 
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Table 2 and Table 3 report the primary 2018 and 2020 social-welfare-related outputs from 
various RPS targets for Scenario 1 (the base case). The social benefits/costs of using any RPS target 
relative to the 20% RPS is categorized into five dimensions: (1) welfare losses from reducing electricity 
demand based on the rule of half (also called the rule of one-half), which approximates the changes in 
consumer surplus for small changes in supply (here electricity prices). With the assumption of fixed and 
linear demand curves, the welfare decrease as a result of losing past customers is calculated by 
multiplying half of the additional costs to consumers by the decrease in the consumption level [38-39]; 
(2) welfare losses from inducing higher electricity generation costs; (3) welfare gains from decreasing 
GHG emissions; (4) welfare gains from reducing criteria pollutant emissions; and finally (5) welfare 
gains from increasing employment. We assumed that the summation of these elements represents the 
total welfare change resulting from implementing each RPS target. Note that the generation costs in 
Tables 2 and 3 include transmission costs and integration costs along with production costs.    
For the base scenario (Scenario 1), in both 2018 and 2020, the main drivers of welfare change 
among different cases are changes in generation cost and employment, followed by GHG reductions and 
electricity demand decrease. Electricity demand reductions are expected to have a relatively minor effect 
on welfare since the electricity prices and demand levels do not increase drastically relative to the 20% 
RPS.  
As shown in Table 2, all RPS targets in 2018 would reduce total welfare relative to the 20% RPS 
target by $102.8 million (the 27% RPS) to $494.9 million (the 50% RPS). As expected, total social 
welfare from RPS targets would increase over time (from 2018 to 2020) since renewable electricity 
generation will become less expensive; as result, the relatively lower increase in generation costs could 
be completely offset by the benefits of lower emissions and higher employment. Social welfare gains of 
RPS targets are expected to increase further after 2020. Welfare benefit/cost calculations beyond 2020 
require assumptions that are out of the context of this study.    
For 2020 (Table 3), an RPS target of 27% would increase total social welfare by $33.2 million 
over that of the 20% RPS. The main drivers of for higher social welfare comprise higher employment 
(which would increase welfare by $378.1 million), the reduction in GHG emissions (which would 
increase welfare by $285 million), and the reduction in criteria pollutant emissions (which would 
increase welfare by $57.2 million), but these are counterbalanced by the higher generation costs which 
would decrease social welfare by $672.3 million, and the welfare decrease resulting from reducing 
electricity demand which would be negligible ($-14.8 million). All other RPS targets would result in 
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losses of total welfare relative to the 20% RPS, and the loss would increase with the RPS target, 
resulting, for example, in a $478.3 million decrease in social welfare for the 50% RPS.   
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Table 2 2018 social benefit/cost analysis for various RPS targets under Scenario 1. 
 
Table 3 2020 social benefit/cost analysis for various RPS targets under Scenario 1. 
  
  Electricity demand Electricity cost GHGs Criteria pollutant Employment Total Change 
in Welfare            
($ Million)   
Total Electricity Demand (GWh) 
Ave. Price ($/kWh) 
(1) Change   in Welfare            ($ Million) 
Total Costs-      ($ Million) 
(2) Change   in Welfare            ($ Million) 
Total GHG reductions (ton CO2 equ.) 
(3) Change   in Welfare           ($ Million) 
(4) Change in Welfare             ($ Million) 
Jobs/year change 
(5) Change   in Welfare            ($ Million) 
RPS 20% 306,228 0.1483 0.0 41,368 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
RPS 27% 301,869 0.1531 -10.5 42,138 -770.1 -8,937,507 268.1 53.9 7,114 355.7 -102.8 
RPS 33% 299,284 0.1568 -29.5 42,783 -1,414.7 -16,347,196 490.4 98.9 14,395 719.8 -135.1 
RPS 40% 293,893 0.1601 -72.7 43,256 -1,887.2 -19,318,820 579.6 115.9 17,617 880.8 -383.6 
RPS 50% 290,546 0.1641 -123.4 43,922 -2,553.8 -25,008,824 750.3 149.4 25,653 1,282.7 -494.9 
  Electricity demand Electricity cost GHGs Criteria pollutant Employment Total Change 
in Welfare            
($ Million)   
Total Electricity Demand (GWh) 
Ave. Price ($/kWh) 
(1) Change   in Welfare            ($ Million) 
Total Costs-      ($ Million) 
(2) Change   in Welfare            ($ Million) 
Total GHG reductions (ton CO2 equ.) 
(3) Change   in Welfare           ($ Million) 
(4) Change in Welfare             ($ Million) 
Jobs/year change 
(5) Change   in Welfare            ($ Million) 
RPS 20% 315,922 0.1524 0.0 42,353 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
RPS 27% 310,156 0.1576 -14.8 43,025 -672.3 -9,500,706 285.0 57.2 7,562 378.1 33.2 
RPS 33% 306,762 0.1617 -42.7 43,731 -1,378.2 -17,635,475 529.1 106.2 15,530 776.5 -9.1 
RPS 40% 299,548 0.1698 -141.9 44,903 -2,550.1 -27,505,656 825.2 165.9 25,082 1,254.1 -446.8 
RPS 50% 295,078 0.1752 -237.5 45,720 -3,367.2 -35,810,002 1,074.3 215.4 36,733 1,836.6 -478.3 
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For all scenarios defined in Table 1, Figure 6 shows the 2020 total welfare change (relative to the 
20% RPS) resulting from any RPS target. As shown, using the non-LCA rates instead of the LCA rates 
(Scenario 2 relative to Scenario 1) has little effect on welfare change. This is reasonable given the fact 
that the use of LCA rates does not appreciably change GHG emission reductions for the comparative 
analysis. Under the higher CO2 social cost of $60/ton (Scenario 3), all RPS targets would produce 
welfare gains, with the 50% RPS offering the highest welfare gain ($595 million). Increasing the CO2 
social cost to $90/ton (Scenario 4) would further favor higher RPS targets; the 50% RPS would generate 
the most social gain for this case (with a total welfare gain of $1670 million).           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Comparative 2020 welfare analysis for various RPS targets under different scenarios. 
 
We can also observe in Figure 6 that using lower monetary value for employment (Scenario 5) 
drastically decreases the welfare gains from implementing an RPS target; even the 27% RPS would 
decrease social welfare relative to the 20% RPS target. Without the inclusion of employment benefits 
(Scenario 6), even the 27% RPS target would decrease social welfare by $344 million. Note that many 
social benefit/cost studies do not directly include employment benefits in their analyses.  
Scenario 7 addresses the effects of a drastic decrease in the renewable technology costs 
(assuming substantial technology improvements) in years after 2020, in place of the base assumption 
that the costs decrease smoothly over time. The less expensive future renewable generation would favor 
higher RPS targets, as expected; the 50% RPS would bring about the highest welfare gains.  
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Finally, Scenario 8 represents a lower carbon market price condition, assuming that the 
California Air Resources Board (CARB) floor prices would be adopted rather than the base carbon 
market forecasts.36 When using lower carbon market price forecasts, all RPS targets lead to higher total 
social welfare losses since with lower carbon reduction credits for renewables, RPS targets induce 
higher generation costs, relative to the 20% RPS. As can be observed in Figure 6, when assuming CARB 
floor prices (Scenario 8), the 27% RPS would reduce total social welfare by $254 million, compared to a 
social welfare gain of $33 million by assuming our base carbon price scenario.      
Summarizing the results, we can infer that under almost every scenario evaluated, the mandated 
33% RPS does not offer the highest social welfare benefits. For relatively low carbon social cost values 
and smooth changes in technology costs, a slightly lower target, like the 27% RPS, would be more 
socially beneficial than the 33% RPS. This is primarily because generation costs would drastically 
increase at higher targets, and the higher GHG reduction and employment benefits cannot offset the 
higher generation costs. For high carbon social cost values, and/or when the cost of renewable 
generation declines substantially, higher RPS targets, like 50%, would be more beneficial than the 
current mandated 33% target, since higher RPS targets induce greater GHG emissions reductions. The 
choice of the 33% RPS mandate for California was not based on a detailed analysis of different RPS 
targets. Therefore, it is not clear how policy makers have chosen the mandated target over other targets. 
However, our analysis shows that California could be better off by implementing either a slightly lower 
target or a much higher target, depending on the social cost of GHG emissions, the employment benefit 
considerations, and the anticipated technology diffusion.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion  
Several interesting policy implications emerge from our study. Our analysis indicates that to meet any 
RPS target level for California, the average price of producing electricity will increase; however, our 
estimated price increase is lower than those found in other studies [8]. It is likely that previous studies 
have overestimated the costs of meeting RPS targets as a result of using constant demand forecasts. 
Another major finding is that California can meet all RPS targets using a variety of RPS eligible 
technologies. This result favors RPS policies for the state; if some renewable technologies may still need 
time for commercialization, the availability of other renewables that can fill the gap will reduce the 
potential risks of an RPS policy.  
We estimated that the 33% and 50% RPS targets would mitigate GHG emissions by 17.6 and 
35.8 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO2e), relative to the 20% RPS. However, 
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the average cost of reducing GHG emissions by an RPS would increase as the target increases, ranging 
from $71 for the 33% RPS to $94 per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions for the 50% RPS. 
These values are relatively high compared to the prices prevalent in the current carbon markets [33-34], 
even though they are generally lower than the values found in other RPS studies [30]. As some studies 
have shown, California’s RPS(s) may not be a cost effective option to reduce GHGs compared to other 
policies, e.g., a well-functioning and appropriately priced carbon market. 
Using a detailed social benefit/cost analysis, we showed that the mandated 33% RPS would not 
offer the highest social benefits under almost every scenario evaluated. For modest social cost of carbon 
and smooth reductions in technology costs, a slightly lower target (like the 27% RPS) would provide the 
highest welfare gains among the studied RPS targets because, as RPS increases further, sudden jumps in 
generation costs would entirely offset GHG reduction and employment benefits. For high carbon social 
costs and/or when the cost of renewable generation substantially declines over time, higher RPS targets, 
such as 50%, would be more beneficial to society than the current 33% target. Without employment 
benefits, all RPS targets would reduce total social welfare relative to the 20% RPS.  
From a practical and policy perspective, this study focused on only one aspect of the RPS design: 
the RPS target value. Many other aspects of RPSs can be likewise studied and refined as necessary. The 
types of renewables to be eligible for the RPS, the duration and stability of targets, and the enforcement 
requirements are other aspects that should be analyzed in greater depth. Moreover, we did not study the 
consequences of the possibility that California may fail to meet its RPS targets [40]. Finally, while our 
model accounts for the effects of California’s newly-established carbon market on the RPS policies, it 
does not account for the complex effects of RPS targets on the carbon market. Future work can address 
the above-mentioned limitations.  
The analysis framework we have developed can be employed to evaluate RPS targets further in 
the future beyond 2020. Using our approach, policy makers can obtain important insights required for 
choosing among various RPS targets. As part of our future work, we will apply this study’s approach to 
examine the social welfare effects of the 2030 RPS target for California, a subject of blistering political 
debates in the state.     
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Appendix A. Demand, Supply, and Equilibrium  
The original RPS Calculator is a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet partial equilibrium model which equilibrates 
the demand and supply of the electricity sector (Equation B1). In the original RPS Calculator, ܦ is the 
fixed total electricity demanded, and ܵ is the total electricity supplied as a function of supply cost, ܲ௦:   
ܦ = ܵ ቀܲ௦൫ߠ௦ഥ , ௙ܲഥ , ܴܲܵ, … ൯ቁ                                                                                              (ܤ1) 
Electricity demand in the RPS Calculator is currently static; the model applies the California 
Energy Commission (CEC) study’s demand forecasts, but does not allow demand to change if electricity 
price changes [41]. That is, the CEC study have estimated demand by using electricity generation costs 
(prices) that are based on the 20% (or 30%) RPS; as a result, the demand estimates are inconsistent with 
the demand expected over time from implementing other RPS targets. Our model incorporates short-run 
and long-run demand functions that are responsive to prices and estimates the demand endogenously. In 
addition, we updated the base demand forecasts of the RPS Calculator, using the 2013 integrated energy 
policy report (IEPR)’s electricity demand estimates [42]. 
The supply cost (price) is a function of: 1) ௙ܲഥ , the vector of fuel (natural gas, coal, waste, etc.) 
prices exogenously determined; 2) ߠݏഥ  the vector of parameters that affect the supply cost (other than fuel 
prices), e.g., capital and operating cost for all generation types; and 3) other parameters like the RPS 
target. Changes in any of the above parameters are likely to affect the supply function, and consequently 
the equilibrium electricity prices. 
Aggregating the renewable cost and performance data, the RPS Calculator selects the renewable 
resources needed to meet the RPS target(s) and constructs the supply function in Equation B1. The RPS 
calculations start with an estimation of the renewable resources statewide that the California (regional) 
utilities must procure between 2008 and 2020 to meet a specified RPS target by 2020. Then, the total 
energy resources required are calculated along with the required quantity of renewable energy, 
considering RPS percent of retail sales, minus the actual renewable generation claimed by California 
utilities in 2007. Finally, projects are ranked using a modified version of the renewable energy 
transmission initiative’s (RETI’s) “net value” approach [43] developed by the RETI Environmental 
Working Group.  
The RPS Calculator estimates California’s annual electricity generation costs in future years. In 
addition to the cost of constructing new energy resources, the RPS Calculator estimates changes in 
factors such as transmission, distribution, fuel costs, and CO2 allowance price, all of which result in a 
projection of California’s total electricity expenditures in various horizon years under different scenarios 
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(i.e., under different RPS targets). The resulting average electricity cost per kWh for each year is the 
total statewide electricity expenditure divided by total retail sales. However, California's retail rate 
designs vary among the electric utilities in the state, so the cost impact of meeting an RPS could be 
different for an individual household or business. 
We use many of the same RPS Calculator data sources for the supply side calculations: (1) the 
California public utilities commission (CPUC) - Energy division project database [44]; (2) transmission 
data [43]; (3) fuel price and CO2 allowance price forecasts based on the Market Price Referent (MPR) 
methodology [45]; and (4) estimates of distributed renewable energy potentials using the E3 and Black 
and Veatch analysis [46]. All costs are expressed in 2008 dollars. The RPS Calculator does not attempt 
to predict breakthroughs in technological development or changes in capital or operational costs. 
Currently, the main driver of the conventional generation costs is the price of natural gas. The RPS 
Calculator assumes that all resources are developed by independent power producers (IPPs) using a 20-
year financing life. Based on the financing lifetime, the RPS calculates the resulting 20-year levelized 
$/MWh power purchase agreement (PPA) price at the threshold that allows the IPP to achieve its target 
after-tax equity return. 
We modified the RPS Calculator by adding two new features. First, realistically, electricity 
demand should respond to prices. Therefore, we replaced the fixed demand in Equation B1 to specify 
demand as a function of electricity prices: 
               ܦ(ܲௗ) = ܵ ቀܲ௦൫ߠ௦ഥ , ௙ܲഥ , ܴܲܵ, … ൯ቁ                                                                                  (ܤ2) 
where ܲௗ is the electricity price on the demand side (in $/kWh). The assumed demand function is a simple 
Cobb-Douglas function with a constant elasticity, ݁: 
   ܦ(ܲௗ) = ܽ. (ܲௗ)௘                                                                                                              (ܤ3) 
  For the demand-price response, we assume a short-run elasticity of -0.1 and a long-run elasticity 
of -0.50. Our elasticity assumptions are close to the average estimates found in other studies [47-49], 
especially in California-specific studies [50]. 
With this modification to the RPS Calculator, electricity demand responds to changes in the 
electricity sector that affect electricity prices. To that end, demand forecasts are updated using three main 
assumptions: (1) we assume that prices are equal to average costs or ܲௗ = ܲ௦[50]; (2) we calculate the 
total short-run demand in 2014 and the total long-run demand in 2020 based on the respective short-run 
and long-run demand functions given in Equation B3 with their respective elasticities, assuming that by 
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2020, the long-run elasticity of -0.5 will be effective; and (3) we modify all the elements of total demand 
based on the updated total energy and their assumed shares of total demand in each year.  
Each RPS Calculator run provides us with estimates of average annual costs of producing 
electricity (2008$/KWH) for 2014 through 2020. The 2014 and 2020 electricity prices are determined 
with the assumption that prices (ܲௗ) equal average costs (ܲ௦). The prices are then used to estimate the 
2015 and 2020 total demand. By updating demand values, the RPS calculator is run again. The new run 
results in new average costs, new prices, and new demand values. The procedure iteratively updates 
demand based on the updated costs (prices) of electricity (ܲ௦ or ܲௗ) until demand and supply match [51].  
Appendix B. Fuel Price Distributions  
As the second extension, we allow some key RPS Calculator parameters and inputs related to electricity 
generation costs to be randomized. For example, because of uncertainty associated with future fuel prices, 
we allow fuel prices to be random variables with normal distributions. Figure B1 shows the probability 
density functions of 2020 fuel prices (in terms of 2008 dollars) adopted in this study. We determine the 
shown distributions based on the high, average, and low numbers from various studies [42 & 52-53]. To 
use California-specific values, we borrow estimates mainly from the Klein study [52]. We use these values 
as our benchmark values and slightly modify them based on the RPS Calculator estimates. Since we need 
to use California-specific numbers, we use the AEO2012 Energy outlook values [53] only for the price of 
wood (the high and low wood prices have not been estimated for California). In addition, because of the 
rapid shale gas developments, we modify the natural gas prices using the 2013 IEPR’s forecasts, which 
are based on the North American Market Gas Trade (NAMGas) model [42]. 
To estimate the distributions on Figure B1 from the high, medium, and average values, we assume 
that (1) the fuel prices are normally distributed, (2) the mean of the normal distribution is exactly at the 
determined medium (average) value, and (3) with a probability of 0.99, the corresponding fuel cost would 
lie between the low and high estimates. Using these assumptions, we can determine the variance of the 
normal distribution and realize the normal distribution, using the estimated mean and the estimated 
variance. 
By allowing these key parameters/inputs to vary randomly, the modified RPS model is able to 
capture the effects of different fuel price combinations (See Rouhani [54] for more details on the 
procedure).  
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Fig. B1. Distributions of fuel prices in 2020 
 
Appendix C. GHGs, Criteria Pollutants, and Employment Calculations   
Three new modules are introduced to the RPS Calculator. These modules calculate the changes in GHG 
emissions, the criteria pollutant-related benefits of renewable generation, and labor under different RPS 
targets and different parameters assumed for electricity generation. Our GHG emissions calculations are 
based on two sets of emission rates (Table C1- row a): (1) the non-life-cycle analysis (non-LCA) values 
inherited from the RPS Calculator; and (2) the LCA values borrowed from the International Panel of 
Climate Change (IPCC) [55]. The default LCA values in the model are the median emission rate values 
determined by the IPCC study. Calculating the changes in both renewable and conventional generation 
(in GWh), we determine the changes in GHG emissions for different years by multiplying the change in 
each generation type by the corresponding emission rate for that generation type. Note that conventional 
generation is assumed to grow or shrink as needed, based on increases or decreases in natural gas 
generation only.  
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Table C1 Model parameters for: (a) GHG emissions rates using LCA rates (1) and Non-LCA rates (2); (b) criteria pollutant benefits; (c) labor rates 
  Biomass Biogas Geo thermal Hydro Solar PV Solar Thermal Wind Natural Gas Nuclear Coal Energy Efficiency 
a-1) GHG Non-LCA 
(gr/kWh) - - - - - - - 181 - 500 NA 
a-1) GHG  LCA 
(gr/kWh) 37 55 45 4 46 22 12 469 16 1,001 NA 
b) Criteria pollut. 
benefits ($/MWh) 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.53 2.81 2.81 - - - NA 
c) Labor (job/GWh) 1.31 1.31 0.72 0.77 1.14 0.41 0.1 0.04 0.31 0.27 0.32 
 
The second new module estimates the health-related benefits of reducing criteria pollutant 
emissions by various renewable electricity generation types, as compared with natural gas generation. 
The assumed monetary benefits per MWh are borrowed from the Siler-Evans’ database (California-
specific data), which accounts for the public health and environmental damages of SO2, NOx, and 
primary PM2.5 emissions [56-57]. The damages are based on the Air Pollution Emission Experiments 
and Policy (APEEP) analysis model. The APEEP model values mortality from air pollution at $6 million 
per life lost [58-59]. Note that the assumed marginal benefits for California are significantly lower than 
those of other states since renewable electricity generation in California mainly replaces cleaner natural 
gas generation (relative to coal ) while in other states, it mainly replaces more dominant coal generation.  
For the third module on labor calculation, we employed California’s Clean Energy Future 
estimates of job creation rates [60] (the number of job-years per GWh) for different types of power 
generation, as shown in Table C1- row c, which includes the effects of subsidies and excludes the effects 
on other sectors. Using these rates, we calculate changes in labor from the base case to a specific 
scenario/case, as a result of any change in the generation mix. From this, we can calculate the change in 
labor based on two factors: (1) the change in each instate generation type multiplied by the 
corresponding rate in Table C1- row c, and (2) the change in energy efficiency reductions multiplied by 
the corresponding job rate. 
Appendix D. Other Assumptions and Limitations 
We run the modified RPS model for a number of different major scenarios that reflect alternative RPS 
adoption levels. Specifically, we vary the RPS target levels between 20% and 50% and allow key 
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parameters to vary randomly. For all other parameters in which we made no change, the RPS Calculator 
parameters are assumed at their default values. 
In all scenario cases examined, the project selection (supply provision) is based on minimizing 
the costs of producing electricity, although other project selection criteria such as environmental 
considerations and commercial priorities could be assumed in the model as well. The social welfare loss 
projected from a decrease in demand is based on the rule of half [38-39].  
Although our modeling represents a very significant step forward, we did have to make some 
simplifications, and there are some limitations that we would like to note. First and most important, our 
model does not take the details of conventional generation into account. A second simplification is that 
the uncertainties associated with future fuel costs and their distributions are applied exogenously. 
Endogenous uncertainties are generally more robust and realistic in formulating the potential 
relationships and correlations between fuel costs, i.e., these costs might move together or they might be 
affected by electricity prices.    
One of our major assumptions about California’s carbon market is that the carbon prices are 
exogenously determined, considering only two different carbon price trends: (1) modified future Green 
Exchange estimates as our base price forecasts, and (2) CARB Floor prices [61]. We then examine the 
impact of these two price trends on our analysis. In fact, our model does not account for the potential 
effects of RPS targets on carbon market prices.  
Another limitation is that our analysis estimates the effects on the electricity sector as a whole. 
Extending the analysis into various sectors could be a useful addition. Moreover, the employment effects 
on sectors other than electricity should be considered in the social welfare analysis. Finally, we should 
include more detailed calculations of energy efficiency changes and electric vehicle demand in our 
modeling since the impact of these factors on the electricity sector are continuously growing. 
Appendix E. Impact of Shale Gas Development 
As we mentioned before, the price of natural gas is one of the main factors affecting conventional 
generation costs. The volatility in natural gas prices has important consequences for the California’s 
electricity sector, which can also impact the social welfare calculations of various RPS targets.  
Because of increased shale gas production in North America, natural gas prices have dropped 
dramatically [62]. Sudden declines in NG prices could make renewables and RPS policies less favorable 
since they expand the gap between the cost of renewable electricity generation and the cost of natural 
gas generation. The CPUC estimates of the effects of the 33% RPS [63] and many other previous 
estimates [64] are based on natural gas price forecasts that did not account for the significant impact of 
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shale gas development. The substantial decrease in natural gas prices, which is largely due to shale gas 
developments, is evident in the difference between the 2009 IEPR’s forecasts and the 2013 IEPR’s 
forecasts.  
In this section, we examine the effects of the decrease in natural gas price forecasts on electricity 
prices. The average 2020 natural gas price forecast has declined from $9/MMBTU (the 2009 IEPR 
forecast-without shale gas developments) to $4.5/MMBTU (the 2013 IEPR forecast-with shale gas 
developments). Table E1 summarizes the effects of this change in natural gas prices on electricity prices 
for the 2020 analysis year, under various RPS targets (all values are in 2008 dollars). Relative to the 
previous high natural gas price forecast scenario, electricity prices are estimated to decrease by -5.85% 
to -1.77%; the effects are higher for lower RPS targets. Similarly, shale gas developments (natural gas 
prices) have substantial social welfare implications for electricity generation costs, emissions, and 
employment, all of which demonstrates the importance of taking into account complexities of a social 
welfare analysis since many unpredicted events can take place in the future.   
 
   Table E1 Impact of shale gas development on the RPS analysis- 2020 
    Electricity price 
  Price           no shale gas ($/kWh) 
Price             with shale gas ($/kWh) 
percent change 
RPS 20% 0.1619 0.1524 -5.85% 
RPS 27% 0.1627 0.1576 -3.13% 
RPS 33% 0.1677 0.1617 -3.57% 
RPS 40% 0.1724 0.1698 -1.54% 
RPS 50% 0.1775 0.1752 -1.30% 
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